Terrorism

This is the central theme of Jihad & Co., a new book by �鶹��Ƶ's Aisha Ahmad, an assistant professor of political science at �鶹��Ƶ Scarborough and the Munk School of Global Affairs. She explores how economic savvy – more than ideological fervour – can help explain jihadist power.

“To understand why jihadists win, we need to follow the money on the ground,” Ahmad says. “Even when there is total chaos, there are a lot of people getting rich in these war zones. It's these business elites who give jihadists power.”

She says jihadists are essentially “the big box chain that out-compete smaller warlords,” allowing them to monopolize power and create order out of chaos.

In gathering research for the book, Ahmad travelled to smugglers markets in Pakistan, Somalia, Lebanon and Mali to interview local merchants, security operatives and jihadists.

The research was deeply personal for her. Her family members, who are from Peshawar, were involved in the caravan trade along the historic Silk Road. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Peshawar’s business community became the arms smuggling network fuelling the insurgency. Before long, it became criminalized.

“My grandfather was a smuggler and all of the big warlord commanders were his clients,” she says. “Many of the stories that emerged in my research, I had witnessed as a child. I remember the suitcases full of cash, the heavy machine guns pulling up at the front door, and playing in the arms bazaar of Darra Adam Khel.”

She says jihadists succeed because other warlords simply cannot compete in the market for security. In a civil war, all armed groups “tax” local businesses operating in their turf, extracting money in exchange for security. Ahmad suggests that a civil war is essentially a competition between these warlord protection rackets, but this can lead to debilitating costs.

The worse the ethnic and tribal fragmentation, the higher the taxes will be for the business class.

“Fragmentation is expensive,” says Ahmad. “Imagine I want to sell you 20 sacks of sugar, but you live in a rival warlord’s turf. Moving our goods from point A to B will double the protection payments – one payment to my ethnic warlord and one to yours. These compound taxes cut right into profit margins.”

This is where modern Islamist groups enter.

“Islamist groups have an advantage because they can sell security across ethnic and tribal lines. They come in saying, ‘We’re not from tribe A or B. We’re only Muslims.’ The business elites love this,” she says. “They are all desperate to sell goods across factional lines, and Islamists give them a way to overcome costly fragmentation.”

Buying into the Islamist protection racket means having to pay only one low tax payment. Because Islamists can offer their protection racket services to tribes A, B and C, they can charge lower security prices across the board.

When Ahmad interviewed her first mob bosses from Mogadishu, she says it felt familiar.

“It’s the exact same hustle. Everyone talks about taxes and check points. By this point, I can see the war on every single price tag in the bazaar.”

If these war economies are feeding the rise of Islamist groups, what does that mean for efforts at establishing peace?

For one, simply throwing money at governments in conflict zones is ineffective and promotes corruption, often benefitting one group at the expense of others. The good news, notes Ahmad, is that the local business community responds well to economic incentives since their loyalties can often be bought.

“These elites are pragmatists, not ideologues. They want low taxes and a permissive business environment, so the key is to check the corrupt players on the government side and stop them from exploiting and frustrating the business class,” she says. “Corruption drives these elites right back into the arms of the Islamists.”

Ahmad also insists on humility from the international community, especially in the need to pause and reflect on the effects of overthrowing foreign governments.

“One of the important lessons from this book is that while states are easy to break, they are very hard to create, especially from the top down. If you look at Libya, Afghanistan, Somalia and Iraq, what emerged was more brutal than we could have ever imagined.”

Witnessing the brutality is what drove Ahmad to tell this story.

“This book was a labour of love but also part of my personal life journey, my only inheritance from a volatile and traumatic world. In telling these truths, I hope it serves the purpose of peace.”

Tragedy in Nice: “Fundamental French values are under attack” says �鶹��Ƶ’s Paul Cohen

lavende4 — Mon, 18 Jul 2016 13:08:24 +0000

Tragedy in Nice: “Fundamental French values are under attack” says �鶹��Ƶ’s Paul Cohen

lavende4 Mon, 07/18/2016 - 09:08

Cutline

Floral tributes on the Promenade des Anglais to victims of the Nice attack (David Ramos/Getty Images)

Terry Lavender

Author legacy

Terry Lavender

Topic

Global Lens

France

Terrorism

Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy

Centre for the Study of France and the Francophone World

On July 14, Bastille Day, 84 people were killed and hundreds injured when a man drove a truck down the crowded Promenade des Anglais in Nice during a fireworks celebration. Paul Cohen, director of the Munk School of Global Affairs’ Centre for the Study of France and the Francophone World, is currently in Paris. He spoke to �鶹��Ƶ News about the attack.

Why is France being subjected to so many terrorist incidents?

It’s firstly important to recall that other countries have been targeted more frequently and at greater cost than France: Turkey and Iraq notably. Other western countries have been the theatre of recent attacks too – think of the United States or Belgium. Without a fuller picture of the clandestine networks that might still be in place in France or elsewhere, or a better understanding of the social, cultural or psychic mechanisms that drive solitary attackers like the perpetrator of the Orlando attack, I would suggest that a better question would be to inquire about the broader context: the tectonic reshaping of the Middle East in the wake of the United States’ invasion and occupation of Iraq, the brutal Syrian civil war and the emergence of Daech, the departure of substantial numbers of citizens of western countries (including France, Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom, as well as the US and Canada) to fight with ISIS, and the return of a certain number determined to commit attacks, and the military engagement of American and French forces (on a limited basis) in the Syrian conflict to combat Daech.

At this stage in the police investigation, we know very little about the perpetrator of the attack in Nice, his motivations, or his connections to accomplices, and it is altogether too early to determine whether this latest attack is connected to what took place in Paris last year – and in the event that it is, to evaluate the nature of this link.

Do you think there is any special significance in Nice being the target?

Again, at this point in the investigation, it’s too early to speculate about the attacker’s motivations in choosing the Promenade des Anglais.

The choice of target certainly holds powerful significance for French people: a public space that stands at the heart of public life in Nice, built to serve as a glamorous backdrop for moneyed tourists from France and around the world, a landscape for Old World Mediterranean leisure.

Less well known perhaps to English-speaking audiences is that Nice lies in the heartland of the extreme-right National Front party. Its longtime mayor and current president of the urban agglomeration, Christian Estrosi, has long made security and law-and-order issues the central plank of his leadership – as mayor, he vastly expanded the municipal police presence, installed elaborate videosurveillance systems, and took tough measures against what were identified as public order issues. Estrosi, along with Eric Ciotti, the deputy who represents Nice in the National Assembly, have also repeatedly interrogated whether French people of North African descent are fully legitimate members of the national community. In this, they are among those on the right who flirt with the border that separates them from the National Front. Estrosi, Ciotti, and other leaders on the right (as well as far right) have already seized on the attacks to criticize the Socialist government’s alleged weakness in the face of the terror threat.

Is there any significance in the attack taking place on Bastille Day, besides the opportunity to impact a large number of people gathered together?

Again, it’s simply not possible to speculate on the attacker’s motivations or choice of date and location.

For French people, however, it is clear that July 14 holds special significance: as a national holiday, one that gestures back to the Revolutionary origins of French Republicanism; as a moment when French people perform the third value in the great revolutionary triptych “Liberty, Equality, Fraternity”, in open-air public dances organized in village squares or the courtyards of firefighters’ barracks, in free outdoor concerts and fireworks displays like the one struck last night. Even without speculating on the reasons and motivations for the attack, for many French people, in the wake of Charlie Hebdo and Bataclan attacks, it appears that fundamental French values are under attack: freedom of speech; laïcité (the French concept that roughly translates as “separation of Church and State”); festive forms of public sociability; and peaceful coexistence of social and cultural diversity.

Will this have an effect on France's economy? Its culture? Its values?

Even as we mourn and measure the terrible loss of human life, it is also important to emphasize that terrorism of this nature does not pose an existential threat to the political or economic systems of the nations in which they unfold. Recall for example that France has a long experience with terrorism, stretching back to anarchist violence in the late nineteenth century, violent far-left groups like Action Directe and terrorist cells piloted from Iran via Lebanese Hezbollah in the 1980s, the series of bombings that struck Paris in the 1990s in the context of the Algerian civil war, or what remains bloodiest phase of postwar terrorism that was the work of the Organisation Armée Secrète (constituted by disaffected French army officers and white settlers angered by France’s withdrawal from Algeria at the end of the Algerian War). It is likely that French tourism will suffer (tourist numbers in Paris over the past year appear to have declined in the wake of last year’s attacks, for example); but the economic risks of, say, Brexit, austerity measures, or a broader global slowdown are far greater.

The potential for political leaders to mobilize the fear of terrorist attacks to call for further restrictions on civil liberties, and granting police, intelligence services and magistrates greater authority, are likelier to have long-term effects: by reshaping the terms of public debate, and perhaps leading to changes in the constitutional, legal, procedural or policing frameworks for maintaining law and order. The search for a balance between civil liberties, rule of law and security is a universal challenge for open democracies like France (or Canada for that matter) – the events of the last 19 months have forced the French to face them in particularly painful and urgent ways.

The killing of Canadian hostage John Ridsdel: �鶹��Ƶ's Aisha Ahmad on why terrorists get away with kidnapping

lavende4 — Wed, 27 Apr 2016 13:31:08 +0000

The killing of Canadian hostage John Ridsdel: �鶹��Ƶ's Aisha Ahmad on why terrorists get away with kidnapping

lavende4 Wed, 04/27/2016 - 09:31

Cutline

Philippine soldiers carry out a mock hostage rescue exercise shortly after the kidnapping of John Ridsell and three others last Fall (Ted Aljibe/Getty Images)

Terry Lavender

Author legacy

Terry Lavender

Topic

Faculty of Arts & Science

Subheadline

“If payment is withheld, they must pull the trigger or their business model fails”

Canadians were shocked to learn recently that retired journalist John Ridsdel, who had been kidnapped along with three others last September in the Philippines, had been beheaded by his captors, the militant group Abu Sayyaf.

Assistant professor Aisha Ahmad of the University of Toronto has been studying how jihadist groups finance their militant operations in civil wars across the world. �鶹��Ƶ News asked her to comment on the Ridsdel kidnapping.

Why do groups such as Abu Sayyaf take hostages?

Militant groups of all ideological stripes take hostages to gain ransom money, draw attention to their cause, and attract foreign supporters. Hostage-taking not only generates revenues; it also instills fear. In North Africa, Al Qaeda affiliates in Algeria and Mali not only made tens of millions of dollars from ransoms, but also became known as a powerful and terrifying regional terrorist network. In South Asia, Pakistani insurgents and criminal networks in the restive border region kidnap foreigners and locals alike, making the tribal belt virtually impossible to navigate safely. In the Levant, ISIL has not only made millions through kidnapping foreigners in Iraq and Syria, but these extremists were also so ideologically committed to murdering their hostages that they eventually ran out of foreigners to behead. In each of these cases, the two key motivations behind terrorist kidnapping have been these financial and reputational benefits.

How does taking Western hostages advance the cause of groups such as this? Is taking hostages an effective strategy?

From a militant group’s perspective, kidnapping is a fairly low-cost, and high-returns gamble. Indeed, taking a civilian by gunpoint is much easier than planning an organized attack on a government building or military compound. In fact, for terrorist groups that are weak and losing ground, kidnapping looks like a win-win strategy. No matter what the outcome, the terrorists can find a way to benefit. If the ransom is paid, the militants use that windfall to expand their operations. If the ransom is not paid, then the terrorists murder the victim in a shocking and public fashion, which captures headlines around the world, increases their profile, and attracts more covert transnational support for their operations.

Time is of the essence in these situations. The kidnappers see their hostage as an investment, and they want their investment to pay off. Over the course of hostage negotiations, kidnappers often reduce their demands to a price that they think they can successfully extract. If this drags on, some business-minded militants try to recover their initial investment into the hostage operation, so that they can at least break even. But when the point is reached where the investment is determined to be a sunk cost, the hostage dies. These are real and serious threats that affect tourists, business travellers, journalists, and humanitarian workers.

[quote (class="additional class" | author="author name")]

“People will do everything they can to save the ones they love”[/quote]

Is kidnapping a new strategy on the part of terrorist groups, or has hostage-taking long been one of their weapons?

I cannot actually remember a time when “we have your daughter” was not a tactic used by bad people. This strategy itself is old, and it works because no human being can handle the magnitude of that kind of trauma. The mind breaks. So people will do everything they can to save the ones they love. Families will go bankrupt trying to pay ransoms to bring their relatives home safely.

The perpetrators of these hostage situations are usually terrorists, narco-traffickers or organized criminal networks. All of them use threats of rape, torture, and death to ensure payment, and must make good on their threats when denied their plunder. They have to kill, or they lose credibility. If payment is withheld, they must pull the trigger or their business model fails.

When Canadians or other Westerners are taken hostage, we hear about it in the media. But are Westerners particularly at risk compared to people who live in the countries where these groups operate?

Everyone I know who has been kidnapped has been a native citizen of the country they were taken hostage in. Of course, in poorer countries, foreigners are often seen as potentially more lucrative targets, so there is a premium on their heads. But ordinary locals are also victims, and their loved ones grieve their losses just the same.

What’s the best strategy for countries such as Canada to adopt when one of their citizens is taken hostage? Is there a best strategy in fact?

This is a no-win situation. In a hostage crisis, we are forced to choose between equally horrific options. If we pay, our loved ones are saved, but the group gets a windfall and increases its capabilities to harm others. If we don’t pay, our loved ones are savagely and publicly murdered, and the terrorist group increases its credibility and even gets more covert transnational support from sympathizers.

It is also folly to think that not paying the ransom in any one case will deter terrorists from future kidnappings, or make them go away. It’s not that easy. Rather, each beheading actually adds credence and weight to the terrorists’ threats, which then makes it more likely that they will attain a ransom for their next victim. When it is your daughter, you will pay any price. There is simply no perfect solution for this problem.

Aisha Ahmad (@ProfAishaAhmad) is an assistant professor in the department of political science and a member of the Centre for South Asian Studies at the Munk School of Global Affairs’ Asian Institute. Her work explores the political economy of Islamist power in weak and failed states. She has conducted field research in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Kenya. In 2012, she was a fellow at the Belfer Center on Science and International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School. She is currently working on a book on the relationship between clandestine business and Islamist movements in civil wars across the Muslim world.